### When is an encryption scheme secure?

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is **perfectly secret** if **for every** probability distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$ , **every** message  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , and **every** ciphertext  $c \in \mathcal{C}$  with  $\Pr[C = c] \neq 0$ :

$$\Pr[M = m \mid C = c] = \Pr[M = m]$$

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is perfectly secret if for every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ , and every  $c \in C$ :

$$\Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = \Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]$$

**Definition**: A private key encryption scheme  $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$  with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is **perfectly indistinguishable** if for every  $\mathcal{A}$  it holds:

$$\Pr[\textit{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\textit{eav}} = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$$

### Is there a secure encryption scheme?

All the encryption schemes we have seen so fare are **not** secure according to our formal definitions

Is there a secure encryption scheme?

### Is there a secure encryption scheme?

All the encryption schemes we have seen so fare are **not** secure according to our formal definitions

Is there a secure encryption scheme?

To all whom it may concern:

Be it known that I, GILBERT S. VERNAM, residing at Brooklyn, in the county of Kings and State of New York, have invent-

5 ed certain Improvements in Secret Signaling Systems, of which the following is a specification.

This invention relates to signaling systems and especially to telegraph systems. 0 Its object is to insure secrecy in the transmission of meansmal field.

mission of messages and, further, to provide a system in which messages may be transmitted and received in plain characters

or a well-known code but in which the sig-5 naling impulses are so altered before transmission over the line that they are unintelligible to anyone intercepting them.



Gilbert Vernam

- Patented in 1917 by Gilbert Vernam with no proof of security (Shannon's definition of perfect secrecy is from 1949)
- Also called *one-time pad*
- Shannon subsequently proved that the cipher is perfectly secret
- $\oplus$  denotes the bitwise *exclusive or* (XOR) operator

x	y	$x\oplus y$
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	0

For an integer  $\ell > 0$ , the Vernam cipher is defined as follows:

•  $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ ,  $\mathcal{C} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ ,  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ 


For an integer  $\ell > 0$ , the Vernam cipher is defined as follows:

- $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ ,  $\mathcal{C} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ ,  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$
- Gen: return a key k chosen uniformly at random from  $\mathcal{K}$ , i.e.,  $\Pr[K = k] = 2^{-\ell} \ \forall k$



For an integer  $\ell > 0$ , the Vernam cipher is defined as follows:


- $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ ,  $\mathcal{C} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ ,  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$
- Gen: return a key k chosen uniformly at random from  $\mathcal{K}$ , i.e.,  $\Pr[K = k] = 2^{-\ell} \ \forall k$






For an integer  $\ell > 0$ , the Vernam cipher is defined as follows:

- $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ ,  $\mathcal{C} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ ,  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$
- Gen: return a key k chosen uniformly at random from  $\mathcal{K}$ , i.e.,  $\Pr[K = k] = 2^{-\ell} \forall k$




Is it correct?

 $\mathsf{Dec}_k(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)) \stackrel{?}{=} m$ 



Is it correct?

 $\mathsf{Dec}_k(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)) \stackrel{?}{=} m$ 




 $\mathsf{Dec}_k(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)) = \mathsf{Dec}_k(k \oplus m)$ 

(definition of  $Enc_k$ )

Is it correct?

 $\mathsf{Dec}_k(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)) \stackrel{?}{=} m$ 




$$\mathsf{Dec}_k(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)) = \mathsf{Dec}_k(k \oplus m)$$
  
=  $k \oplus (k \oplus m)$ 

(definition of  $Enc_k$ ) (definition of  $Dec_k$ )

Is it correct?

 $\mathsf{Dec}_k(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)) \stackrel{?}{=} m$ 




$$\mathsf{Dec}_k(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)) = \mathsf{Dec}_k(k \oplus m)$$
$$= k \oplus (k \oplus m)$$
$$= (k \oplus k) \oplus m$$

(definition of  $Enc_k$ ) (definition of  $Dec_k$ ) (associativity of  $\oplus$ )

Is it correct?

 $\mathsf{Dec}_k(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)) \stackrel{?}{=} m$ 




$$Dec_k(Enc_k(m)) = Dec_k(k \oplus m)$$
$$= k \oplus (k \oplus m)$$
$$= (k \oplus k) \oplus m$$
$$= \underbrace{00 \dots 0}_{\ell \text{ times}} \oplus m$$

(definition of  $Enc_k$ ) (definition of  $Dec_k$ ) (associativity of  $\oplus$ ) (definition of  $\oplus$ )

Is it correct?

 $\mathsf{Dec}_k(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)) \stackrel{?}{=} m$ 



$$Dec_k(Enc_k(m)) = Dec_k(k \oplus m)$$
$$= k \oplus (k \oplus m)$$
$$= (k \oplus k) \oplus m$$
$$= \underbrace{00 \dots 0}_{\ell \text{ times}} \oplus m$$
$$= m$$

(definition of  $Enc_k$ ) (definition of  $Dec_k$ ) (associativity of  $\oplus$ ) (definition of  $\oplus$ ) (definition of  $\oplus$ )

### Example

Alice wants to send a message m = 001010 of  $\ell = 6$  bits to Bob. Alice and Bob agreed to use a Vernam cipher and have already exchanged a key k = 101101

What is the ciphertext c?

m = 0	0	1	0	1	0	$\oplus$
k = 1	0	1	1	0	1	=
c = 1	0	0	1	1	1	-

\_

### Example

Alice wants to send a message m = 001010 of  $\ell = 6$  bits to Bob. Alice and Bob agreed to use a Vernam cipher and have already exchanged a key k = 101101

What is the ciphertext *c*?

 $m = 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \qquad \oplus$   $k = 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \qquad =$   $c = 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \qquad =$ 

Bob receives the ciphetext c = 110101 from Alice. Alice and Bob have agreed to use a Vernam cipher with key k = 000110

What is the plaintext m?

$$c = 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \qquad \oplus \\ k = 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 = \\ m = 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0$$

- $\bullet\,$  The historic ciphers were defined over the Latin alphabet  $\{a,\ldots,z\}$
- The Vernam cipher is defined over the binary alphabet {0, 1}

- The historic ciphers were defined over the Latin alphabet  $\{a,\ldots,z\}$
- The Vernam cipher is defined over the binary alphabet  $\{0, 1\}$

How do we send messages using the Latin (or any other) alphabet?

- The historic ciphers were defined over the Latin alphabet  $\{a,\ldots,z\}$
- The Vernam cipher is defined over the binary alphabet {0, 1}

How do we send messages using the Latin (or any other) alphabet?

- We can always encode the symbols in the message alphabet in binary on Alice's side (before encryption)...
- ... and decode them on Bob's side (after decryption)

#### Decimal - Binary - Octal - Hex – ASCII Conversion Chart

Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII	Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII	Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII	Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII
0	00000000	000	00	NUL	32	00100000	040	20	SP	64	01000000	100	40	@	96	01100000	140	60	
1	00000001	001	01	SOH	33	00100001	041	21	!	65	01000001	101	41	Α	97	01100001	141	61	а
2	00000010	002	02	STX	34	00100010	042	22		66	01000010	102	42	В	98	01100010	142	62	b
3	00000011	003	03	ETX	35	00100011	043	23	#	67	01000011	103	43	С	99	01100011	143	63	С
4	00000100	004	04	EOT	36	00100100	044	24	\$	68	01000100	104	44	D	100	01100100	144	64	d
5	00000101	005	05	ENQ	37	00100101	045	25	%	69	01000101	105	45	E	101	01100101	145	65	е
6	00000110	006	06	ACK	38	00100110	046	26	&	70	01000110	106	46	F	102	01100110	146	66	f
7	00000111	007	07	BEL	39	00100111	047	27		71	01000111	107	47	G	103	01100111	147	67	g
8	00001000	010	08	BS	40	00101000	050	28	(	72	01001000	110	48	н	104	01101000	150	68	h
9	00001001	011	09	HT	41	00101001	051	29	)	73	01001001	111	49	1	105	01101001	151	69	i
10	00001010	012	<b>0</b> A	LF	42	00101010	052	2A	*	74	01001010	112	4A	J	106	01101010	152	6A	j
11	00001011	013	0B	VT	43	00101011	053	2B	+	75	01001011	113	4B	К	107	01101011	153	6B	k
12	00001100	014	0C	FF	44	00101100	054	2C	,	76	01001100	114	4C	L	108	01101100	154	6C	1
13	00001101	015	0D	CR	45	00101101	055	2D	-	77	01001101	115	4D	М	109	01101101	155	6D	m
14	00001110	016	0E	SO	46	00101110	056	2E		78	01001110	116	4E	N	110	01101110	156	6E	n
15	00001111	017	0F	SI	47	00101111	057	2F	1	79	01001111	117	4F	0	111	01101111	157	6F	0
16	00010000	020	10	DLE	48	00110000	060	30	0	80	01010000	120	50	Р	112	01110000	160	70	р
17	00010001	021	11	DC1	49	00110001	061	31	1	81	01010001	121	51	Q	113	01110001	161	71	q
18	00010010	022	12	DC2	50	00110010	062	32	2	82	01010010	122	52	R	114	01110010	162	72	r
19	00010011	023	13	DC3	51	00110011	063	33	3	83	01010011	123	53	S	115	01110011	163	73	S
20	00010100	024	14	DC4	52	00110100	064	34	4	84	01010100	124	54	Т	116	01110100	164	74	t
21	00010101	025	15	NAK	53	00110101	065	35	5	85	01010101	125	55	U	117	01110101	165	75	u
22	00010110	026	16	SYN	54	00110110	066	36	6	86	01010110	126	56	V	118	01110110	166	76	v
23	00010111	027	17	ETB	55	00110111	067	37	7	87	01010111	127	57	W	119	01110111	167	77	w
24	00011000	030	18	CAN	56	00111000	070	38	8	88	01011000	130	58	Х	120	01111000	170	78	x
25	00011001	031	19	EM	57	00111001	071	39	9	89	01011001	131	59	Y	121	01111001	171	79	у
26	00011010	032	1A	SUB	58	00111010	072	ЗA	:	90	01011010	132	5A	Z	122	01111010	172	7A	z
27	00011011	033	1B	ESC	59	00111011	073	3B	;	91	01011011	133	5B	[	123	01111011	173	7B	{
28	00011100	034	1C	FS	60	00111100	074	3C	<	92	01011100	134	5C	Λ	124	01111100	174	7C	1
29	00011101	035	1D	GS	61	00111101	075	3D	=	93	01011101	135	5D	1	125	01111101	175	7D	}
30	00011110	036	1E	RS	62	00111110	076	3E	>	94	01011110	136	5E	٨	126	01111110	176	7E	~
31	00011111	037	1F	US	63	00111111	077	3F	?	95	01011111	137	5F	_	127	01111111	177	7F	DEL

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

ASCII Conversion Chart.doc Copyright © 2008, 2012 Donald Weiman 22 March 2012

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is **perfectly secret** if **for every** probability distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$ , **every** message  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , and **every** ciphertext  $c \in \mathcal{C}$  with  $\Pr[C = c] \neq 0$ :

$$\Pr[M = m \mid C = c] = \Pr[M = m]$$

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is perfectly secret if for every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ , and every  $c \in C$ :

$$\Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = \Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]$$

**Definition**: A private key encryption scheme  $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$  with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is **perfectly indistinguishable** if for every  $\mathcal{A}$  it holds:

$$\Pr[\textit{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\textit{eav}} = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$$

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is **perfectly secret** if **for every** probability distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$ , **every** message  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , and **every** ciphertext  $c \in \mathcal{C}$  with  $\Pr[C = c] \neq 0$ :

$$\Pr[M = m \mid C = c] = \Pr[M = m]$$

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is perfectly secret if for every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ , and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

$$\Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = \Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]$$

**Definition**: A private key encryption scheme  $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$  with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is **perfectly indistinguishable** if for every  $\mathcal{A}$  it holds:

$$\Pr[\textit{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\textit{eav}} = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$$

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is perfectly secret if for every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ , and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

 $\Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = \Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]$ 

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is perfectly secret if for every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ , and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

 $\Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = \Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]$ 

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

**Proof:** 

For any  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is perfectly secret if for every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ , and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

 $\Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = \Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]$ 

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

**Proof:** 

For any  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \Pr[K \oplus m = c]$ 

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is perfectly secret if for every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ , and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

 $\Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = \Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]$ 

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

**Proof:** 

For any  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \Pr[K \oplus m = c]$$
$$= \Pr[K = c \oplus m]$$

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is perfectly secret if for every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ , and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

 $\Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = \Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]$ 

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

**Proof:** 

For any  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \Pr[K \oplus m = c]$$

$$= \Pr[K = c \oplus m] = 2^{-\ell}$$

**Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  is perfectly secret if for every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ , and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

 $\Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = \Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]$ 

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

**Proof:** 

For any  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$ :

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \Pr[K \oplus m = c]$ 

 $= \Pr[K = c \oplus m] = 2^{-\ell} = \Pr[K = c \oplus m']$  $= \Pr[K \oplus m' = c] = \Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c]$ 

 $\square$ 

• The key must be (at least) as long as the message

- The key must be (at least) as long as the message
- Pre-sharing a long key is difficult

- The key must be (at least) as long as the message
- Pre-sharing a long key is difficult
- The key must be stored securely

(e.g., how would you handle full-disk encryption?)

- The key must be (at least) as long as the message
- Pre-sharing a long key is difficult
- The key must be stored securely

(e.g., how would you handle full-disk encryption?)

• The bits of the key must be generated independently and uniformly at random

- The key must be (at least) as long as the message
- Pre-sharing a long key is difficult
- The key must be stored securely

(e.g., how would you handle full-disk encryption?)

- The bits of the key must be generated independently and uniformly at random
- The key must never be reused (not even partially!)

You should never re-use a one-time pad. It's like toilet paper; if you re-use it, things get messy.



– Michael Rabin

What happens if a key is reused?

- $c_1 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_1)$
- $c_2 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_2)$

What happens if a key is reused?

- $c_1 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_1)$
- $c_2 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_2)$

The adversary can compute  $c_1 \oplus c_2$ 



What happens if a key is reused?

- $c_1 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_1)$
- $c_2 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_2)$

The adversary can compute  $c_1 \oplus c_2$ 

 $c_1 \oplus c_2 = (k \oplus m_1) \oplus (k \oplus m_2)$ 



What happens if a key is reused?

- $c_1 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_1)$
- $c_2 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_2)$

The adversary can compute  $c_1 \oplus c_2$ 

```
c_1 \oplus c_2 = (k \oplus m_1) \oplus (k \oplus m_2)
```

 $=m_1\oplus (k\oplus k)\oplus m_2$ 

(commutativity + associativity)



What happens if a key is reused?

- $c_1 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_1)$
- $c_2 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_2)$

The adversary can compute  $c_1 \oplus c_2$ 

```
c_1 \oplus c_2 = (k \oplus m_1) \oplus (k \oplus m_2)
```

 $=m_1\oplus (k\oplus k)\oplus m_2$ 

 $= m_1 \oplus 0 \dots 0 \oplus m_2$ 

(commutativity + associativity)

(definition of  $\oplus$ )



What happens if a key is reused?

- $c_1 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_1)$
- $c_2 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_2)$

The adversary can compute  $c_1 \oplus c_2$ 

$$c_1 \oplus c_2 = (k \oplus m_1) \oplus (k \oplus m_2)$$

- $= m_1 \oplus (k \oplus k) \oplus m_2$
- $= m_1 \oplus 0 \dots 0 \oplus m_2$
- $= m_1 \oplus m_2$

(commutativity + associativity)

(definition of  $\oplus$ )

(definition of  $\oplus$ )

The adversary learns  $m_1 \oplus m_2$ 



What happens if a key is reused?

- $c_1 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_1)$
- $c_2 = \operatorname{Enc}_k(m_2)$

The adversary can compute  $c_1 \oplus c_2$ 

$$c_1 \oplus c_2 = (k \oplus m_1) \oplus (k \oplus m_2)$$

- $= m_1 \oplus (k \oplus k) \oplus m_2$
- $= m_1 \oplus 0 \dots 0 \oplus m_2$
- $= m_1 \oplus m_2$

- (commutativity + associativity)
- (definition of  $\oplus$ )
- (definition of  $\oplus$ )
- The adversary learns  $m_1 \oplus m_2$

Do we care?



• Frequency analysis! (e.g.,  $e \oplus e = 0 \dots 0$ )

Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII	Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII	Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII
32	00100000	040	20	SP	64	01000000	100	40	@	96	01100000	140	60	•
33	00100001	041	21	!	65	01000001	101	41	Α	97	01100001	141	61	а
34	00100010	042	22	4	66	01000010	102	42	в	98	01100010	142	62	b
35	00100011	043	23	#	67	01000011	103	43	С	99	01100011	143	63	с
36	00100100	044	24	\$	68	01000100	104	44	D	100	01100100	144	64	d
37	00100101	045	25	%	69	01000101	105	45	E	101	01100101	145	65	е
38	00100110	046	26	&	70	01000110	106	46	F	102	01100110	146	66	f
39	00100111	047	27		71	01000111	107	47	G	103	01100111	147	67	g
40	00101000	050	28	(	72	01001000	110	48	н	104	01101000	150	68	h
41	00101001	051	29	)	73	01001001	111	49	1	105	01101001	151	69	i
42	00101010	052	2A	*	74	01001010	112	4A	J	106	01101010	152	6A	j
43	00101011	053	2B	+	75	01001011	113	4B	К	107	01101011	153	6B	k
44	00101100	054	2C	,	76	01001100	114	4C	L	108	01101100	154	6C	1
45	00101101	055	2D	-	77	01001101	115	4D	M	109	01101101	155	6D	m
46	00101110	056	2E		78	01001110	116	4E	N	110	01101110	156	6E	n
47	00101111	057	2F	1	79	01001111	117	4F	0	111	01101111	157	6F	0
48	00110000	060	30	0	80	01010000	120	50	Р	112	01110000	160	70	р
49	00110001	061	31	1	81	01010001	121	51	Q	113	01110001	161	71	q
50	00110010	062	32	2	82	01010010	122	52	R	114	01110010	162	72	r
51	00110011	063	33	3	83	01010011	123	53	S	115	01110011	163	73	s
52	00110100	064	34	4	84	01010100	124	54	т	116	01110100	164	74	t
53	00110101	065	35	5	85	01010101	125	55	U	117	01110101	165	75	u
54	00110110	066	36	6	86	01010110	126	56	V	118	01110110	166	76	v
55	00110111	067	37	7	87	01010111	127	57	W	119	01110111	167	77	w
56	00111000	070	38	8	88	01011000	130	58	Х	120	01111000	170	78	x
57	00111001	071	39	9	89	01011001	131	59	Y	121	01111001	171	79	у
58	00111010	072	3A	:	90	01011010	132	5A	Z	122	01111010	172	7A	z
59	00111011	073	3B	;	91	01011011	133	5B	[	123	01111011	173	7B	{
60	00111100	074	3C	<	92	01011100	134	5C	A.	124	01111100	174	7C	1
61	00111101	075	3D	=	93	01011101	135	5D	1	125	01111101	175	7D	}
62	00111110	076	3E	>	94	01011110	136	5E	٨	126	01111110	176	7E	~
63	00111111	077	3F	?	95	01011111	137	5F	_	127	01111111	177	7F	DEL
					1					1				

- Frequency analysis! (e.g.,  $e \oplus e = 0 \dots 0$ )
- Patterns in the ASCII encoding
  - The encoding of all letters starts with 01...
  - The encoding of a space starts with 00...


Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII	Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII	Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII
32	00100000	040	20	SP	64	01000000	100	40	@	96	01100000	140	60	
33	00100001	041	21	!	65	01000001	101	41	A	97	01100001	141	61	а
34	00100010	042	22		66	01000010	102	42	В	98	01100010	142	62	b
35	00100011	043	23	#	67	01000011	103	43	C	99	01100011	143	63	с
36	00100100	044	24	\$	68	01000100	104	44	D	100	01100100	144	64	d
37	00100101	045	25	%	69	01000101	105	45	E	101	01100101	145	65	e
38	00100110	046	26	&	70	01000110	106	46	F	102	01100110	146	66	f
39	00100111	047	27		71	01000111	107	47	G	103	01100111	147	67	g
40	00101000	050	28	(	72	01001000	110	48	Н	104	01101000	150	68	h
41	00101001	051	29	)	73	01001001	111	49	I	105	01101001	151	69	i
42	00101010	052	2A	*	74	01001010	112	4A	J	106	01101010	152	6A	j
43	00101011	053	2B	+	75	01001011	113	4B	ĸ	107	01101011	153	6B	k
44	00101100	054	2C	,	76	01001100	114	4C	L	108	01101100	154	6C	I
45	00101101	055	2D	-	77	01001101	115	4D	М	109	01101101	155	6D	m
46	00101110	056	2E		78	01001110	116	4E	N	110	01101110	156	6E	n
47	00101111	057	2F	1	79	01001111	117	4F	0	111	01101111	157	6F	0
48	00110000	060	30	0	80	01010000	120	50	Р	112	01110000	160	70	p
49	00110001	061	31	1	81	01010001	121	51	Q	113	01110001	161	71	q
50	00110010	062	32	2	82	01010010	122	52	R	114	01110010	162	72	r
51	00110011	063	33	3	83	01010011	123	53	S	115	01110011	163	73	S
52	00110100	064	34	4	84	01010100	124	54	Т	116	01110100	164	74	t
53	00110101	065	35	5	85	01010101	125	55	U	117	01110101	165	75	u
54	00110110	066	36	6	86	01010110	126	56	V	118	01110110	166	76	v
55	00110111	067	37	7	87	01010111	127	57	W	119	01110111	167	77	w
56	00111000	070	38	8	88	01011000	130	58	Х	120	01111000	170	78	х
57	00111001	071	39	9	89	01011001	131	59	Y	121	01111001	171	79	у
58	00111010	072	ЗA	:	90	01011010	132	5A	Z	122	01111010	172	7A	z
59	00111011	073	3B	;	91	01011011	133	5B	[	123	01111011	173	7B	{
60	00111100	074	3C	<	92	01011100	134	5C	١	124	01111100	174	7C	1
61	00111101	075	3D	=	93	01011101	135	5D	1	125	01111101	175	7D	}
62	00111110	076	3E	>	94	01011110	136	5E	٨	126	01111110	176	7E	~
63	00111111	077	ЗF	?	95	01011111	137	5F	-	127	01111111	177	7F	DEL

- Frequency analysis! (e.g.,  $e \oplus e = 0 \dots 0$ )
- Patterns in the ASCII encoding
  - The encoding of all letters starts with 01...
  - The encoding of a space starts with 00...
  - Trivial to identify the exclusive-or of letter and space!


Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII	Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII	Decimal	Binary	Octal	Hex	ASCII
20	20400000	0.40	00	20		24000000	100	40	2	1 00	04400000	440	60	
32 33	00100000	040 041	20 21	SP !	64 65	01000000 01000001	100 101	40 41	@ A	96 97	01100000 01100001	140 141	60 61	2
33 34	00100001		21	! «	66	01000001		41			01100001		62	a
		042					102		В	98		142		b
35	00100011	043	23	# r	67	01000011	103	43	C	99	01100011	143	63 64	C d
36	00100100	044	24	\$	68	01000100	104	44	D	100	01100100	144	64	d
37	00100101	045	25	%	69 70	01000101	105	45	E	101	01100101	145	65 66	e
38	00100110	046	26	&	70	01000110	106	46	F	102	01100110	146	66	f
39	00100111	047	27		71	01000111	107	47	G	103	01100111	147	67	g
40	00101000	050	28	(	72	01001000	110	48	H	104	01101000	150	68	h
41	00101001	051	29	)	73	01001001	111	49	I	105	01101001	151	69	i
42	00101010	052	2A	*	74	01001010	112	4A	J	106	01101010	152	6A	j
43	00101011	053	2B	+	75	01001011	113	4B	K	107	01101011	153	6B	k
44	00101100	054	2C	,	76	01001100	114	4C	L	108	01101100	154	6C	1
45	00101101	055	2D	-	77	01001101	115	4D	М	109	01101101	155	6D	m
46	00101110	056	2E		78	01001110	116	4E	Ν	110	01101110	156	6E	n
47	00101111	057	2F	1	79	01001111	117	4F	0	111	01101111	157	6F	0
48	00110000	060	30	0	80	01010000	120	50	P	112	01110000	160	70	р
49	00110001	061	31	1	81	01010001	121	51	Q	113	01110001	161	71	q
50	00110010	062	32	2	82	01010010	122	52	R	114	01110010	162	72	r
51	00110011	063	33	3	83	01010011	123	53	S	115	01110011	163	73	s
52	00110100	064	34	4	84	01010100	124	54	Т	116	01110100	164	74	t
53	00110101	065	35	5	85	01010101	125	55	U	117	01110101	165	75	u
54	00110110	066	36	6	86	01010110	126	56	V	118	01110110	166	76	v
55	00110111	067	37	7	87	01010111	127	57	w	119	01110111	167	77	w
56	00111000	070	38	8	88	01011000	130	58	х	120	01111000	170	78	x
57	00111001	071	39	9	89	01011001	131	59	Y	121	01111001	171	79	у
58	00111010	072	3A	:	90	01011010	132	5A	Z	122	01111010	172	7A	z
59	00111011	073	3B	;	91	01011011	133	5B	[	123	01111011	173	7B	{
60	00111100	074	3C	<	92	01011100	134	5C	1	124	01111100	174	7C	i i
61	00111101	075	3D	=	93	01011101	135	5D	1	125	01111101	175	7D	}
62	00111110	076	3E	>	94	01011110	136	5E	v	126	01111110	176	7E	~
63	00111111	077	3F	?	95	01011111	137	5F	I	127	01111111	177	7F	DEL
00		011	01		1 00	01011111	101	01	-	121				DEC

• Alice buys an item from the adversary for 5.20  ${\in}$ 


- Alice buys an item from the adversary for  $5.20 \in$
- Alice makes a wire transfer from her bank's website




- Alice buys an item from the adversary for  $5.20 \in$
- Alice makes a wire transfer from her bank's website
- The bank website sends a message of the form PAY <RECIPIENT\_IBAN> <AMOUNT> to the bank's backend
- $m = \underbrace{01010000010000101011001}_{\text{PAY}} \underbrace{01001001...00110010}_{\text{IBAN}} \underbrace{0000000100000100}_{\text{AMOUNT (520)}}$





- Alice buys an item from the adversary for  $5.20 \in$
- Alice makes a wire transfer from her bank's website
- The bank website sends a message of the form PAY <RECIPIENT\_IBAN> <AMOUNT> to the bank's backend
- $m = \underbrace{01010000010000101011001}_{\text{PAY}} \underbrace{01001001...00110010}_{\text{IBAN}} \underbrace{0000000100000100}_{\text{AMOUNT (520)}}$
- The message is encrypted with a one-time pad




- Alice buys an item from the adversary for 5.20  ${\in}$
- Alice makes a wire transfer from her bank's website
- The bank website sends a message of the form PAY <RECIPIENT\_IBAN> <AMOUNT> to the bank's backend
- $m = \underbrace{010100000100000101011001}_{\text{PAY}} \underbrace{01001001...00110010}_{\text{IBAN}} \underbrace{0000000100000100}_{\text{AMOUNT (520)}}$
- The message is encrypted with a one-time pad


















#### One-time pad in practice

The "red phone": a symbol of the Moscow-Washington hotline

- Actually consisted of two full-duplex telegraph lines, with teletype terminals at the endpoints
- Text-only: speech can be easily misinterpreted
- Text is encrypted using one-time pad
- Keys were exchanged via the embassies, using trusted couriers with briefcases containing sheets of paper with random characters



# One-time pad in practice







www.cryptomuseum.com

 $\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$ 

• Alice notices that, when  $k = 000 \dots 0$ :

 $\ell$  times



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

 $\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$ 

• Alice notices that, when  $k = 000 \dots 0$ :

 $\ell$  times



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

• How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?

• Alice notices that, when  $k = \underbrace{000 \dots 0}$ :

 $\ell$  times

$$\operatorname{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$$



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

- How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?
- Alice decides to "fix" this problem by redefining  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell} \setminus \{000\dots 0\}$

Is this modified one-time pad cipher perfectly secret?

• Alice notices that, when  $k = \underbrace{000 \dots 0}$ :

 $\ell$  times

$$\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$$



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

- How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?
- Alice decides to "fix" this problem by redefining  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell} \setminus \{000\dots 0\}$

Is this modified one-time pad cipher perfectly secret? **No!** 

• Alice notices that, when  $k = 000 \dots 0$ :

 $\ell$  times

$$\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$$



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

- How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?
- Alice decides to "fix" this problem by redefining  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell} \setminus \{000\dots 0\}$

Is this modified one-time pad cipher perfectly secret? **No!** 

Using Shannon's definition:

• Alice notices that, when  $k = 000 \dots 0$ :

 $\ell$  times

$$\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$$



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

- How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?
- Alice decides to "fix" this problem by redefining  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell} \setminus \{000 \dots 0\}$

Is this modified one-time pad cipher perfectly secret? **No!** 

Using Shannon's definition:

• Pick the uniform distribution of  $\mathcal{M}$ , any  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , and c = m

 $\Pr[M = m \mid C = c]$ 

• Alice notices that, when  $k = 000 \dots 0$ :

 $\ell$  times

$$\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$$



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

- How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?
- Alice decides to "fix" this problem by redefining  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell} \setminus \{000\dots 0\}$

Is this modified one-time pad cipher perfectly secret? **No!** 

Using Shannon's definition:

$$\Pr[M = m \mid C = c] = \Pr[C = c \mid M = m] \cdot \frac{\Pr[M = m]}{\Pr[C = c]}$$

• Alice notices that, when  $k = 000 \dots 0$ :

 $\ell$  times

$$\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$$



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

- How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?
- Alice decides to "fix" this problem by redefining  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell} \setminus \{000\dots 0\}$

Is this modified one-time pad cipher perfectly secret? **No!** 

Using Shannon's definition:

$$\Pr[M = m \mid C = c] = \Pr[C = c \mid M = m] \cdot \frac{\Pr[M = m]}{\Pr[C = c]} = 0$$

• Alice notices that, when  $k = 000 \dots 0$ :

 $\ell$  times

$$\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$$



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

- How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?
- Alice decides to "fix" this problem by redefining  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell} \setminus \{000\dots 0\}$

Is this modified one-time pad cipher perfectly secret? **No!** 

Using Shannon's definition:

$$\Pr[M = m \mid C = c] = \Pr[C = c \mid M = m] \cdot \frac{\Pr[M = m]}{\Pr[C = c]} = 0 \quad \neq \Pr[M = m]$$

• Alice notices that, when  $k = \underbrace{000 \dots 0}$ :

 $\ell$  times

$$\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$$



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

- How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?
- Alice decides to "fix" this problem by redefining  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell} \setminus \{000 \dots 0\}$

Is this modified one-time pad cipher perfectly secret? **No!** 

Using the alternative definition:

For any  $m' \neq m$  and c = m:  $\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \Pr[K = 00 \dots 0] = 0$ 

• Alice notices that, when  $k = \underbrace{000 \dots 0}$ :

 $\ell$  times

$$\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$$



The ciphertext coincides with the plaintext!

- How is this compatible with perfect secrecy?
- Alice decides to "fix" this problem by redefining  $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^{\ell} \setminus \{000 \dots 0\}$

Is this modified one-time pad cipher perfectly secret? **No!** 

Using the alternative definition:

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \Pr[K = 00 \dots 0] = 0$  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = \Pr[K = m' \oplus c] \neq 0$ 

For any  $m' \neq m$  and c = m:

The Vernam cipher is perfectly secret, but...

The Vernam cipher is perfectly secret, but...

... keys are long and difficult to share/store

The Vernam cipher is perfectly secret, but...


 $\ldots$  keys are long and difficult to share/store

Is there a perfectly secure cipher that uses short keys?

The Vernam cipher is perfectly secret, but...


 $\ldots$  keys are long and difficult to share/store

Is there a perfectly secure cipher that uses short keys?



No!

**Theorem:** If (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a perfectly secret encryption scheme with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , then  $|\mathcal{K}| \ge |\mathcal{M}|$ 




**Theorem:** If (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a perfectly secret encryption scheme with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , then  $|\mathcal{K}| \ge |\mathcal{M}|$ 

#### **Proof:**

We prove the contrapositive statement:

If  $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$  then the encryption scheme is not perfectly secret.



**Theorem:** If (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a perfectly secret encryption scheme with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , then  $|\mathcal{K}| \ge |\mathcal{M}|$ 


#### **Proof:**


We prove the contrapositive statement:

If  $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$  then the encryption scheme is not perfectly secret.


In particular, we argue that there must exist some m' for which:

$$\Pr[M = m'] \neq \Pr[\mathcal{M} = m' \mid C = c]$$





Consider the uniform distribution over  ${\cal M}$  and let c be a ciphertext that occurs with positive probability




Consider the uniform distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$  and let c be a ciphertext that occurs with positive probability

Let  $\mathcal{M}_c$  denote all messages  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ such that  $m = \text{Dec}_k(c)$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  $\mathcal{M}_c$  $\mathcal{M}_c$  $\mathcal{M}_c$  $\mathcal{M}_c$  $\mathcal{M}_c$  $\mathcal{M}_c$  $\mathcal{M}_c$ 

Consider the uniform distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$  and let c be a ciphertext that occurs with positive probability

Let  $\mathcal{M}_c$  denote all messages  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ such that  $m = \text{Dec}_k(c)$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 

Since Dec is a deterministic algorithm:




Consider the uniform distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$  and let c be a ciphertext that occurs with positive probability

Let  $\mathcal{M}_c$  denote all messages  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ such that  $m = \text{Dec}_k(c)$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 

Since Dec is a deterministic algorithm:

$$egin{aligned} |\mathcal{M}_c| \leq |\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}| \ & \Downarrow \ & \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c 
eq \emptyset \end{aligned}$$

Pick any  $m' \in \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c$ 



Consider the uniform distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$  and let c be a ciphertext that occurs with positive probability


Let  $\mathcal{M}_c$  denote all messages  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ such that  $m = \text{Dec}_k(c)$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 

Since Dec is a deterministic algorithm:

$$egin{aligned} |\mathcal{M}_c| \leq |\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}| \ & \ & \ & \ & \ & \ & \ & \ & \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c 
eq \emptyset \end{aligned}$$

Pick any  $m' \in \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c$ 

•  $\Pr[M = m'] > 0$ 



Consider the uniform distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$  and let c be a ciphertext that occurs with positive probability

Let  $\mathcal{M}_c$  denote all messages  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ such that  $m = \text{Dec}_k(c)$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 


Since Dec is a deterministic algorithm:

$$egin{aligned} |\mathcal{M}_c| \leq |\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}| \ & \ & \ & \ & \ & \ & \ & \ & \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c 
eq \emptyset \end{aligned}$$

Pick any  $m' \in \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c$ 

•  $\Pr[M = m'] > 0$ 

• 
$$\Pr[M = m' \mid C = c] = 0$$



Consider the uniform distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$  and let c be a ciphertext that occurs with positive probability

 $\implies \Pr[M = m'] \neq \Pr[\mathcal{M} = m' \mid C = c]$ 

 $\mathcal{M}$ Let  $\mathcal{M}_c$  denote all messages  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  $\mathcal{C}$ such that  $m = \text{Dec}_k(c)$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  $\mathcal{M}_{c}$ Since Dec is a deterministic algorithm:  $|\mathcal{M}_c| \le |\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$  $\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c \neq \emptyset$ m'Pick any  $m' \in \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c$ •  $\Pr[M = m'] > 0$ 

•  $\Pr[M = m' \mid C = c] = 0$ 

**Theorem:** If (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a perfectly secret encryption scheme with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , then  $|\mathcal{K}| \ge |\mathcal{M}|$ 

**Corollary:** Any perfectly secret encryption scheme with  $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$  and  $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$  is such that  $\max_{k \in \mathcal{K}} |k| \ge \ell$ , where |k| denotes the number of bits of k

**Theorem:** If (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a perfectly secret encryption scheme with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , then  $|\mathcal{K}| \ge |\mathcal{M}|$ 

**Corollary:** Any perfectly secret encryption scheme with  $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$  and  $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$  is such that  $\max_{k \in \mathcal{K}} |k| \ge \ell$ , where |k| denotes the number of bits of k

Inf. If an encryption scheme is perfectly secret and is able to encrypt any message of length  $\ell$  (over the binary alphabet) then it must require the use of at least one key with length at least  $\ell$ .

**Theorem:** If (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a perfectly secret encryption scheme with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , then  $|\mathcal{K}| \ge |\mathcal{M}|$ 

**Corollary:** Any perfectly secret encryption scheme with  $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$  and  $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$  is such that  $\max_{k \in \mathcal{K}} |k| \ge \ell$ , where |k| denotes the number of bits of k

Inf. If an encryption scheme is perfectly secret and is able to encrypt any message of length  $\ell$  (over the binary alphabet) then it must require the use of at least one key with length at least  $\ell$ .


#### **Proof:**

If all keys have length at most  $\ell' < \ell$  then the encryption scheme cannot be perfectly secret. Indeed:

$$|\mathcal{K}| \le \sum_{i=0}^{\ell'} |\{0,1\}^i| = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell'} 2^i = 2^{\ell'+1} - 1 \le 2^\ell - 1 < 2^\ell = |\mathcal{M}|$$

The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:


- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )



The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )






The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$





The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that:


- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

• Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$ 

• Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$ 

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :


• Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 



The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$




The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0,1\}$

 $\Pr[b'=0 \mid b=0] =$ 




The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- $\bullet\,$  Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

$$\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] = \Pr[b' = 0 \mid \mathsf{Enc}_K(m_0) = c] \Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m_0) = c] + \Pr[b' = 0 \mid \mathsf{Enc}_K(m_0) \neq c] \Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m_0) \neq c]$$




The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

$$\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] = 1 \cdot \varepsilon$$
$$+ \Pr[b' = 0 \mid \mathsf{Enc}_K(m_0) \neq c] \Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m_0) \neq c]$$




The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

$$\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] = 1 \cdot \varepsilon + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 - \varepsilon)$$




The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

 $\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ 



The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:


- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0,1\}$

 $\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ 

 $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 



The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )


Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0,1\}$

 $\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ 

 $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 

 $\Pr[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi} = 1] = \Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] \Pr[b = 0] + \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] \Pr[b = 1]$ 




The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0,1\}$

 $Pr[b' = 0 | b = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$   $Pr[b' = 1 | b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$   $Pr[PrivK_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{eav} = 1] = (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2}$ 




The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

 $\begin{aligned} \Pr[b' &= 0 \mid b = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \\ \Pr[b' &= 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2} \\ \Pr[\mathsf{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\mathsf{eav}} = 1] &= (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{4} \end{aligned} \quad \mathsf{Advantage!} \end{aligned}$ 




The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$ ,  $c\in\mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

 $\begin{aligned} \Pr[b' &= 0 \mid b = 0] &= \quad \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \\ \Pr[b' &= 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2} \\ \Pr[\PrivK_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{eav} &= 1] &= (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{4} \end{aligned} \quad \text{Advantage!} \end{aligned}$ 




Note:  $\varepsilon$  can be tiny!

The proof of the theorem shows that there are some  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that:

- $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ )
- $m' \notin \mathcal{M}_c$  (i.e.,  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c] = 0$ )

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - Output b' = 0 if  $\bar{c} = c$
  - Otherwise output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$



 $\begin{aligned} \Pr[b' &= 0 \mid b = 0] &= \quad \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \\ \Pr[b' &= 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2} \\ \Pr[\mathsf{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\mathsf{eav}} = 1] &= (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{4} \end{aligned} \quad \mathsf{Advantage!} \end{aligned}$ 

#### **Running time?**


Note:  $\varepsilon$  can be tiny!

Let  $\mathcal{C}_{m'}$  be the set of all ciphertexts c' such that  $\mathsf{Dec}_k(c') = m'$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 

Let  $\mathcal{C}_{m'}$  be the set of all ciphertexts c' such that  $\text{Dec}_k(c') = m'$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 

The proof of the theorem shows that there are  $m,m'\in\mathcal{M}$  such that:

There is a ciphertext c that can be obtained by encrypting m but cannot be obtained by encrypting m'




Let  $\mathcal{C}_{m'}$  be the set of all ciphertexts c' such that  $\text{Dec}_k(c') = m'$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 

The proof of the theorem shows that there are  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$  such that:

There is a ciphertext c that can be obtained by encrypting m but cannot be obtained by encrypting  $m^\prime$ 

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}] = 1 - \varepsilon \text{ for some } \varepsilon > 0$ 



Let  $\mathcal{C}_{m'}$  be the set of all ciphertexts c' such that  $\text{Dec}_k(c') = m'$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 


The proof of the theorem shows that there are  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$  such that:

There is a ciphertext c that can be obtained by encrypting m but cannot be obtained by encrypting  $m^\prime$ 

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}] = 1 - \varepsilon \text{ for some } \varepsilon > 0$ 

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - If  $\bar{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$ , output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$
  - Otherwise output b' = 0





Let  $\mathcal{C}_{m'}$  be the set of all ciphertexts c' such that  $\text{Dec}_k(c') = m'$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 

The proof of the theorem shows that there are  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$  such that:


There is a ciphertext c that can be obtained by encrypting m but cannot be obtained by encrypting  $m^\prime$ 

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}] = 1 - \varepsilon \text{ for some } \varepsilon > 0$$

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

• Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$ 

- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - If  $\bar{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$ , output a random guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$
  - Otherwise output b' = 0



**Running time?** 

Let  $\mathcal{C}_{m'}$  be the set of all ciphertexts c' such that  $\text{Dec}_k(c') = m'$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ 

The proof of the theorem shows that there are  $m,m'\in \mathcal{M}$  such that:


There is a ciphertext c that can be obtained by encrypting m but cannot be obtained by encrypting  $m^\prime$ 

 $\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m) \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}] = 1 - \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ 

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ :

- Output  $m_0 = m$  and  $m_1 = m'$
- Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\bar{c}$ 
  - If  $\bar{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$ , output a random guess  $b' \in \{0,1\}$
  - Otherwise output b' = 0





#### **Running time?**

Can be exponential: we need to check all keys to decide if  $\bar{c} \in C_{m'}$ 



#### Advantage?

#### Another concrete attack: advantage?

If b=1, then  $m_1=m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c}\in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$ 

#### Another concrete attack: advantage?

If b = 1, then  $m_1 = m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'} \implies b'$  is chosen uniformly at random

If b = 1, then  $m_1 = m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c} \in C_{m'} \implies b'$  is chosen uniformly at random  $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 

If b = 1, then  $m_1 = m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c} \in C_{m'} \implies b'$  is chosen uniformly at random  $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 

If b = 0, then  $m_0 = m$  was encrypted:

If b = 1, then  $m_1 = m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c} \in C_{m'} \implies b'$  is chosen uniformly at random  $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 

If b = 0, then  $m_0 = m$  was encrypted:

• With probability  $1 - \varepsilon$ ,  $\bar{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$  and b' is chosen uniformly at random

If b = 1, then  $m_1 = m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c} \in C_{m'} \implies b'$  is chosen uniformly at random  $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 

If b = 0, then  $m_0 = m$  was encrypted:

- With probability  $1 \varepsilon$ ,  $\overline{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$  and b' is chosen uniformly at random
- With probability  $\varepsilon$ ,  $c \notin C_{m'}$  and b' = 0

If b = 1, then  $m_1 = m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c} \in C_{m'} \implies b'$  is chosen uniformly at random  $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 

If b = 0, then  $m_0 = m$  was encrypted:

- With probability  $1 \varepsilon$ ,  $\overline{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$  and b' is chosen uniformly at random
- With probability  $\varepsilon$ ,  $c \notin C_{m'}$  and b' = 0

 $\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] = (1 - \varepsilon) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \cdot 1 = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ 

If b = 1, then  $m_1 = m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c} \in C_{m'} \implies b'$  is chosen uniformly at random  $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 

If b = 0, then  $m_0 = m$  was encrypted:

- With probability  $1 \varepsilon$ ,  $\overline{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$  and b' is chosen uniformly at random
- With probability  $\varepsilon$ ,  $c \notin C_{m'}$  and b' = 0

 $\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] = (1 - \varepsilon) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \cdot 1 = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ 

 $\Pr[\mathsf{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\mathsf{eav}} = 1] = \Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] \Pr[b = 0] + \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] \Pr[b = 1]$ 

If b = 1, then  $m_1 = m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c} \in C_{m'} \implies b'$  is chosen uniformly at random  $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 

If b = 0, then  $m_0 = m$  was encrypted:

- With probability  $1 \varepsilon$ ,  $\overline{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$  and b' is chosen uniformly at random
- With probability  $\varepsilon$ ,  $c \notin C_{m'}$  and b' = 0

 $\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] = (1 - \varepsilon) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \cdot 1 = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ 

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Priv}\mathsf{K}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi} = 1] = \Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] \Pr[b = 0] + \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] \Pr[b = 1]$$
$$= \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2}$$

If b = 1, then  $m_1 = m'$  was encrypted and  $\bar{c} \in C_{m'} \implies b'$  is chosen uniformly at random  $\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$ 

If b = 0, then  $m_0 = m$  was encrypted:

- With probability  $1 \varepsilon$ ,  $\overline{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}$  and b' is chosen uniformly at random
- With probability  $\varepsilon$ ,  $c \notin C_{m'}$  and b' = 0

 $\Pr[b'=0 \mid b=0] = (1-\varepsilon) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \cdot 1 = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ 

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathsf{Priv}\mathsf{K}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi} = 1] &= \Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] \Pr[b = 0] + \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] \Pr[b = 1] \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{4} \quad \mathsf{Advantage!} \end{aligned}$$

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}] = 1 - \varepsilon \text{ for some } \varepsilon > 0$ 

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Priv}\mathsf{K}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi} = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{4}$ 

How big is  $\varepsilon$ ?

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}] = 1 - \varepsilon \text{ for some } \varepsilon > 0$ 

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Priv}\mathsf{K}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi} = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{4}$ 

How big is  $\varepsilon$ ?

If keys are just one bit shorter than the messages then there is a pair of messages m, m' for which  $\varepsilon \geq \frac{1}{2}$ 

See, e.g., Theorem 17.9 in "A Course in Cryptography" (3rd edition) by Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat for a proof.

 $\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m) \in \mathcal{C}_{m'}] = 1 - \varepsilon$  for some  $\varepsilon > 0$ 

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Priv}\mathsf{K}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi} = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{4} \geq 62.5\%$ 

#### How big is $\varepsilon$ ?

If keys are just one bit shorter than the messages then there is a pair of messages m,m' for which  $\varepsilon \geq rac{1}{2}$ 

The advantage is is at least  $\frac{1}{8}$  !

See, e.g., Theorem 17.9 in "A Course in Cryptography" (3rd edition) by Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat for a proof.

# Limitations of Perfect Secrecy

In Alice's version of OTP we have  $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$ , therefore the scheme cannot be perfectly secure!

# Limitations of Perfect Secrecy

In Alice's version of OTP we have  $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$ , therefore the scheme cannot be perfectly secure!

No private-key encryption scheme can handle arbitrarily long messages and be perfectly secret (recall that  $\mathcal{K}$  is a finite set).

# Limitations of Perfect Secrecy

In Alice's version of OTP we have  $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$ , therefore the scheme cannot be perfectly secure!

No private-key encryption scheme can handle arbitrarily long messages and be perfectly secret (recall that  $\mathcal{K}$  is a finite set).

Individuals occasionally claim they have developed a radically new encryption scheme that is "unbreakable" and achieves the security of the one-time pad without using keys as long as what is being encrypted. [...] Anyone making such claims either knows very little about cryptography or is blatantly lying.

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.

2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

**Proof:** 

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

- 1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.
- 2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

### **Proof:**

1 & 2  $\implies$  perfect secrecy.

Pick any pair of messages  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$  and any  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ .

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

- 1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.
- 2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

### **Proof:**

1 & 2  $\implies$  perfect secrecy.

Pick any pair of messages  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$  and any  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ .

Let k (resp. k') the unique key such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$  (resp.  $Enc_{k'}(m') = c$ ).

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

- 1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.
- 2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

### **Proof:**

1 & 2  $\implies$  perfect secrecy.

Pick any pair of messages  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$  and any  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ .

Let k (resp. k') the unique key such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$  (resp.  $Enc_{k'}(m') = c$ ).

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \Pr[K = k] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$$

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

- 1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.
- 2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

#### **Proof:**

1 & 2  $\implies$  perfect secrecy.

Pick any pair of messages  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$  and any  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ .

Let k (resp. k') the unique key such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$  (resp.  $Enc_{k'}(m') = c$ ).

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m) = c] = \Pr[K = k] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|} = \Pr[K = k'] = \Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m') = c]$$

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.

2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

#### **Proof:**

perfect secrecy  $\implies$  2.

Fix any  $m^* \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m^*) = c] \neq 0$ 

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.

2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

#### **Proof:**

perfect secrecy  $\implies$  2.

Fix any  $m^* \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m^*) = c] \neq 0$ 

For each  $m_i \in \mathcal{M}$  there must be at least one key k such that  $\operatorname{Enc}_k(m_i) = c$ (since  $\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_i) = c] = \Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m^*) = c] \neq 0$ )

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.

2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

#### **Proof:**

perfect secrecy  $\implies$  2.

Fix any  $m^* \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m^*) = c] \neq 0$ 

For each  $m_i \in \mathcal{M}$  there must be at least one key k such that  $\operatorname{Enc}_k(m_i) = c$ (since  $\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_i) = c] = \Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m^*) = c] \neq 0$ )

Let  $K_i$  be the set of keys k such that  $Enc_k(m_i) = c$ 

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.

2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

#### **Proof:**

perfect secrecy  $\implies$  2.

Fix any  $m^* \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that  $\Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m^*) = c] \neq 0$ 

For each  $m_i \in \mathcal{M}$  there must be at least one key k such that  $\operatorname{Enc}_k(m_i) = c$ (since  $\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_i) = c] = \Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m^*) = c] \neq 0$ )

Let  $K_i$  be the set of keys k such that  $Enc_k(m_i) = c$ 

- For all  $m_i$ ,  $|K_i| \ge 1$
- Each key k belongs to at most one set  $K_i$  (otherwise two plaintexts encrypt to the same ciphertexts with the same key)

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.

2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

#### **Proof:**

perfect secrecy  $\implies$  2.

Fix any  $m^* \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$  such that  $\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m^*) = c] \neq 0$ 

For each  $m_i \in \mathcal{M}$  there must be at least one key k such that  $\operatorname{Enc}_k(m_i) = c$ (since  $\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_i) = c] = \Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m^*) = c] \neq 0$ )

Let  $K_i$  be the set of keys k such that  $Enc_k(m_i) = c$ 

- For all  $m_i$ ,  $|K_i| \ge 1$
- Each key k belongs to at most one set  $K_i$  (otherwise two plaintexts encrypt to the same ciphertexts with the same key)

 $\implies$  For all  $m_i$ ,  $|K_i| = 1$ 

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.

2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

#### **Proof:**

perfect secrecy  $\implies$  1.

For each key  $k_i \in \mathcal{K}$  (resp.  $k_j$ ), there is a unique set  $K_i$  (resp.  $K_j$ ) containing  $k_i$  (resp.  $k_j$ ).

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.

2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

#### **Proof:**

perfect secrecy  $\implies$  1.

For each key  $k_i \in \mathcal{K}$  (resp.  $k_j$ ), there is a unique set  $K_i$  (resp.  $K_j$ ) containing  $k_i$  (resp.  $k_j$ ).

$$\Pr[K = k_i] = \Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m_i) = c] = \Pr[\mathsf{Enc}_K(m_j) = c] = \Pr[K = k_j]$$

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.

2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

**Proof:** 

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

- 1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.
- 2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

### **Proof:**

•  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{C}$  therefore  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ 

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

- 1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.
- 2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

### **Proof:**

- $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{C}$  therefore  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$
- Every key is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{2^{\ell}} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

- 1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.
- 2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

### **Proof:**

- $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{C}$  therefore  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$
- Every key is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{2^{\ell}} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$
- Given m and c, there is a unique key k such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ , namely  $c \oplus m$  (recall that  $Enc_k(m) = k \oplus m$ )

**Shannon's Theorem:** Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$ . The scheme is perfectly secret if and only if:

- 1. Every key in  $\mathcal{K}$  is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$  by Gen.
- 2. For every  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , there is a unique key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ .

**Theorem:** The one-time pad encryption scheme is perfectly secret.

### **Proof:**

- $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{C}$  therefore  $|\mathcal{M}| = |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}|$
- Every key is chosen with probability  $\frac{1}{2^{\ell}} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|}$
- Given m and c, there is a unique key k such that  $Enc_k(m) = c$ , namely  $c \oplus m$ (recall that  $Enc_k(m) = k \oplus m$ )

The claim follows from Shannon's theorem.